SEC's Spotlight on Executive Pay: Will It Make a Difference?
Compensation for American CEOs has soared over the past decade, far exceeding inflation and wage gains of ordinary workers -- and leading critics to charge that self-serving insiders have tilted the playing field at shareholders' expense.
过去十年间，美国首席执行官的薪酬与日俱增，远远超过了通货膨胀率和普通工人的工资增长
——导致批评家们纷纷指责自私自利的业内人士故意倾斜竞争的天平，损害股东的利益。
In response, the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 17 took the first step toward adopting rules to better show shareholders how much their top executives and directors are paid. The changes, pushed by the commission's new chairman, ChristopherCox, would for the first time require companies to clearly report a total compensation figure for each of the top five executives and all directors. Disclosure would include the values of stock options, retirement and severance plans and perks worth over $10,000, all of which are difficult or impossible to assess currently. A final vote is expected in the spring after a public-comment period, and most observers expect the rules to be adopted.
对此，美国证券交易委员会（
the Securities and Exchange Commission
）于
1
月
17
日迈出了第一步，旨在通过制定规则让股东更好地了解他们的高管和董事的薪资状况。在委员会的新任主席克里斯托弗·考克斯（
Christopher Cox
）的努力下，委员会制定了新的规定，首次要求公司必须如实报告
5
位高层管理人员和所有董事的薪资状况。披露的内容包括股票期权的价值、退休金、离职计划和超过
10
，
000
美元的额外收入，所有这些在目前都是很难或无法评估的。委员会将在公众评论期之后的春天举行最后的投票，大多数观察家预计这些规定将会被通过。
Will that drive executive pay down?
这是否会促使公司高管的薪酬下降？
Probably not, say several Wharton professors, arguing that executive pay is not necessarily as excessive as the most extreme cases suggest. Still, all agreed that more complete, clearer disclosure would improve the system. "When people are forced to undress in public, they pay attention to their figures," jokes
William C. Tyson
, professor of legal studies and ethics at Wharton.
沃顿商学院的几位教授认为或许不会，因为高管薪酬并不一定就像一些极端案例所披露的那样是个天文数字。然而教授们认为更加全面、更为清晰的披露将会改进这一体制。沃顿商学院法学和伦理学教授威廉·泰森（
William C. Tyson
）开玩笑地说：“当人们被迫在大庭广众之下赤身裸体时，他们就会注意自己的身材。”
Tyson, an expert on the SEC, says he expects the proposals to be approved. "I don't think that there are going to be too many negative comments submitted about this, because it's just requiring more disclosure." But he doubts the changes would dramatically affect executive pay, which is governed by many factors. "I don't see the changes as that significant. Companies now assign outside directors to compensation committees and they are generally setting pay rates at levels governed by supply and demand," Tyson notes. "In principle, there are things in place that should prevent unreasonable salaries, but there are always market imperfections." Better disclosure should help remedy those, he adds.
泰森是证券交易委员会的专家，他说他预计委员会将批准这些建议。“我想对此不会有太多的反对意见，因为它只是要求披露更多的信息。”但是他不认为这一举措会对高管薪酬产生很大的影响，因为高管薪酬是由许多因素决定的。泰森指出：“我认为这一举措不会带来多大的改变。各大公司现在都指派外部的董事进入薪酬委员会，而且薪酬的等级也是由供需情况决定的。原则上说，在防止不合理的薪酬的问题上，已经设定了一些规定，但市场总有不完善的地方。”他补充说，更好的披露机制应该能够解决这个问题。
According to Wharton management professor
Martin Conyon
, "People have been critical of executive compensation for a number of years, and will always be critical of executive compensation." Similar public outrage over accelerated executive pay led to disclosure reforms in 1992 as well.
沃顿商学院的管理学教授马丁·康勇（
Martin Conyon
）认为：“人们批评高管薪酬过高已有许多年了，而且还会继续批评下去。”
1992
年，管理层薪酬剧增引起的众怒也曾导致了披露机制的改革。
"Throughout the 1990s, the level of executive compensation increased dramatically, especially in S&P 500 firms," Conyon notes. Indeed, a study by Wharton accounting professors
John E. Core
and
Wayne Guay
and RandallS.Thomas of VanderbiltUniversity shows that median annual pay for S&P 500 CEOs rose from $1.98 million in 1993 to $6.58 million in 2003. Another study, this one by The Corporate Library, a Portland, Maine, nonprofit that advocates better corporate governance, found that the typical CEO's compensation rose by 15% in 2003 and 30% in 2004 -- about 10 times the inflation rate.
康勇表示：“
90
年代，高管薪酬大幅度上涨。标准普尔
500
强公司的情况更为显著。”事实上，沃顿商学院会计学教授约翰·科尔（
John E. Core
）和韦恩·盖伊
(Wayne Guay)
及范德堡大学
(Vanderbilt University)
的兰德尔·托马斯
(Randall S. Thomas)
教授进行的一项研究表明，标准普尔
500
强公司的首席执行官的中等年薪从
1993
年的
198
万美元上升到
2003
年的
658
万美元。位于缅因州波特兰的非盈利性组织企业图书馆（
Corporate Library
）一直倡导完善公司治理。该公司进行的一项研究发现，首席执行官的薪酬在
2003
年上涨了
15%
，
2004
年上涨
30%
——大约是通货膨胀率的
10
倍。
And a study by LucianBebchuk and YanivGrinstein of Harvard found that from 1993 through 2003, executive pay increased to about twice the level that could be explained by factors such as growth in company size and stock performance. In 2003, compensation for top executives equaled 10% of their companies' annual earnings, compared to 5% percent in 1993, the study reported.
哈佛大学的卢西恩·别布丘克（
Lucian Bebchuk
）和亚尼弗·格林施泰因（
Yaniv Grinstein
）研究发现，从
1993
年到
2003
年，由于公司规模扩大和股票价格上涨等因素而导致的薪酬上升仅为高管实际薪酬增长的一半。该项研究显示，
2003
年，高管薪资是所在公司年度收益的
10%
，而
1993
年只有
5%
。
Factoring in Stock Options
股票期权的影响
Executive compensation is typically a combination of base pay, annual bonus tied somehow to performance, grants of stock, stock options, contributions to a retirement program, and perks, which can include everything from personal use of the corporate jet and limousines, to club memberships and contributions to the executive's designated charities. Currently, it is extremely hard to determine the total value from corporate filings, which don't place a value on the stock options or reveal much about pension plans and perks.( perk 额外收入）
高管薪酬通常包含了基本工资、和业绩挂钩的年终奖、股票、股票期权、退休金和额外收入。额外收入包括了从使用公司的飞机和豪华汽车到俱乐部会员身份和向管理人士指定的慈善机构捐款等等。目前要从公司的档案中确定管理人士薪酬的总价值极其困难，因为公司的档案并未对股票期权进行估价，也没有披露关于养老金和额外收入的情况。
It is fairly clear, though, that compensation has been driven upward by greater use of stock options, which give the executive the right to buy company stock at a set price anytime over a number of years, typically 10. Options can soar in value if the stock price rises above the set purchase, or strike, price. "The explosion in the use of stock options in the 1990s cannot be stressed enough," Conyon says, noting that in the early 1990s, options accounted for about 20% of the typical CEO's compensation. By 2000, that had grown to 50%.
但显而易见的是，股票期权的广泛使用推动了薪酬的增长，管理人士有权在一段时间之内，通常是在
10
年之内的任何时候以预定价格购买公司的股票。如果股票价格超过预定价格或是履约价格，期权的价值就会飙升。康勇说：“
90
年代期权开始被大范围使用，这再怎么强调也不过分。”他指出，在
90
年代早期，期权仅占普通首席执行官薪酬的
20%
左右。而
2000
年，期权已增长为薪酬的
50%
。
Current rules require companies to disclose how many options are granted to each top executive, but not to place a value on them. Experts can estimate values, but ordinary shareholders generally cannot, leading the SEC to propose a standard methodology that will reveal the value and make it easier for shareholders to compare companies. The SEC is also now requiring companies to calculate their executive and employee options expenses in figuring earnings. "As stock options became more important, people thought, 'Hang on a second.... Is the tax and accounting treatment of them appropriate?' It turned out that folks said, 'No,' and it has been changed," Conyon adds.
目前的规定只是要求公司披露每位高层管理人员获得的期权的数量，而不是为期权估价。专家可以估计期权的价值，但普通的股东却不会，因此导致证券交易委员会提出了一个显示期权价值的标准方法，便于股东对比各家公司的情况。而且证交会现在还要求公司在统计收益时计算其管理人员和员工的期权费用。康勇补充说：“随着股票期权变得越来越重要，人们会想‘等一等……对他们的税收和会计处理是否合理？’结果人们发现：‘不合理’，于是便会出现改革。”
While critics say something is wrong when executive pay gains vastly outpace inflation and ordinary Americans' wage gains, it is not that easy to establish a benchmark for determining whether executive pay is excessive, Conyon notes. Numerous studies have shown that American CEOs make considerably more than their counterparts in other countries -- sometimes many times more. But, he points out, the U.S. economy and stock markets have outperformed most foreign ones. "The system here seems to be working."
康勇表示，虽然批评家们认为高管薪酬增长比通货膨胀率和普通美国人的工资增长快得多显示出现行体制中什么地方出了错，但要制定一个基准用来确定高管薪酬是否过度可并不简单。无数的研究表明，美国的首席执行官赚的钱比其他国家的同行多得多——有时甚至是后者的几倍。但是他指出，美国的经济实力之强和股票市场之繁荣也是其他国家难以望其项背的。“这种体系似乎在有效运转。”
Guay does not believe the typical CEO's pay is excessive. "The egregious pay packages that attract so much attention from the press -- of, say, $20 million plus -- only apply to a handful of CEOs." The median CEO in the S&P 1500, composed of the 1500 largest publicly traded companies, "makes about $2.5 million a year." Most CEOs work 12 hours a day for perhaps 350 days a year, he adds, arguing that many top lawyers, consultants or Wall Street traders and analysts make $2.5 million or more.
盖伊认为普通首席执行官的薪酬并不过分。“引起新闻界高度关注的天文数字的薪酬
—
比如
2000
万美元
—
只是少数现象。”由
1500
家最大的公开上市公司组成的标准普尔
1500
的中等首席执行官“每年的薪酬是
250
万美元”。他补充说，大多数首席执行官每年工作
350
天，每天工作
12
个小时。许多高级律师、咨询师或是华尔街的交易师和分析师每年都能赚
250
万美元，甚至更多。
"Why has executive pay risen so much in the last 15 years?" Guay asks. "It seems pretty clear that the world has become more complex, global business is essential, technology is moving faster than ever. Highly skilled CEOs are likely in greater demand than ever before." In addition, today's CEO faces greater risks from litigation and a tougher regulatory environment. And finally, he says, today's CEOs are expected, and often required, to keep a large portion of their personal wealth tied up in their companies' stock and options -- as much as 50% to 75% of their net worth.
盖伊问道：“为什么高管薪酬在过去
15
年的上涨幅度这么大？很明显，世界已变得越来越复杂，商业全球化至关重要，而科技的发展速度也比以前要快。世界可能比以前任何时候都需要大量具有高超技能的首席执行官。”此外，由于诉讼和更为严格的监管环境，今天的首席执行官面临更大的风险。最后，他说，人们期望，而且经常要求现在的首席执行官将个人的大部分财富与所在公司的股票和期权挂钩起来——通常是他们资产净值的
50%
到
75%
。
The idea was to satisfy shareholders' demands that executives' interests be aligned with their own. But an executive with so many eggs in one basket faces serious risk of loss if the stock price falls. Hence, he or she will demand more compensation to offset the risk.
这样做是为了满足股东们的要求，把高管利益与股东利益联系起来。但是由于管理人员把如此多的鸡蛋都放到了一个篮子里，一旦公司股票价值下跌，他就会面临极大的风险。因此，他或她会要求获得更高的薪酬来平衡风险。
In 2003, for instance, the median S&P 500 CEO had an annual pay package worth $6.58 million, but also held just over $30 million in stock and options accumulated over previous years. Guay and his colleagues calculated that a 1% drop in stock price would reduce the portfolio's value by $430,000 (rather than $300,000, because of options' high sensitivity to share price changes). A 20% drop in the stock's price therefore would reduce the portfolio's value by $8.6 million -- leaving the executive in the hole for the year despite the big annual pay package.
例如，
2003
年，中等规模的标准普尔
500
强公司的首席执行官当年的薪酬为
658
万美元，连同前一年的股票和期权他们总共拥有
3000
万美元的股票和期权。盖伊和他的同事们计算出只要股价降低
1%
，整个投资组合的价值就会减少
43
万美元（不是
30
万美元，因为期权对股价的变化高度敏感）。股价下跌
20%
会使投资组合的价值减少
860
万美元——尽管年薪丰厚，但管理人员当年仍会负债累累。
Another study showed that in 2003, U.S. CEOs were paid about 1.6 times more than British ones, but that the Americans' stock and options holdings were worth 5.2 times as much, putting them at far greater risk of loss in a downturn.
另一项研究表明，
2003
年，美国首席执行官的薪酬是英国首席执行官薪酬的
1.6
倍多，但美国首席执行官持有的股票和期权却是英国同行的
5.2
倍，这使他们在经济低迷时期更可能遭受损失。
The Star System
明星体制
Executive pay has also been driven up by relatively recent changes in how people advance to executive ranks, says DavidA.Skeel, Jr., professor of corporate law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Decades ago, people often stayed with one company for an entire career, working their way to the top. Since the 1980s, it has become more common for managers to jump to different firms for their next upward move, making bidding for talent more intense and expensive. "That generates a kind of star system," he says. "If it's a tournament, where most people are not going to make it [to the top], you have to make the prize big for those who do."
宾夕法尼亚大学法学院的公司法教授戴维·斯基尔（
David A.Skeel,Jr.
）说，人们进入管理阶层的方式最近有所改变，这也促使管理人员的薪酬不断上涨。几十年前，人们通常终生都在一家公司工作，通过努力工作晋升入高层。自
80
年代开始，经理人跳槽到其他公司谋求高位的现象已经越来越常见，这使得对人才的竞争更加激烈且更为昂贵。他说：“这造就了一种星级体系。如果这是一个锦标赛，大多数人都无法取胜，那么你必须为那些赢得胜利的人设置更高的奖项。”
In explaining executive compensation, many corporate filings note that the goal is not to have the highest paid executives in the industry, but to set pay just above average, in the second quartile. "It's the LakeWoebegon effect," Skeel suggests. "Everybody expects to be above average, so you get this ratchet effect."
许多公司的文件在解释高管薪金时指出，他们的目标不是向管理人员支付行业中最高的薪金，而是比平均水平高一点的薪金。斯基尔说：
“这是沃博艮湖效应（
Lake Woebegon effect
）效应。而每个人都期望超越平均水平，这样就产生了棘轮效应。”
Many shareholders' groups also complain of a mutual back-scratching society of CEOs and the directors who set the CEO's pay. Directors are not spending their own money, and thus may not have the restraint they would if they were. Also, directors may feel beholden to the CEOs, who typically serve as board chairmen and invite directors onto the board. Technically, directors are elected by shareholders. But in practice, these usually are uncontested elections, as the directors only permit their own slate of candidates to appear on the ballot, with just one candidate per opening.
许多股东集团还抱怨首席执行官和制定首席执行官薪酬的董事为了共同利益互相利用。董事们花得不是自己的钱，因此就无所顾忌。而且董事们可能会对首席执行官怀有感激之情，因为后者通常都是董事会主席，是他们邀请这些董事进入董事会的。从技术层面而言，董事是由股东选举的。但是实际上，这些选举通常都是没有竞争的，因为董事们只会允许他们自己的候选人参加竞选，每次选举只有一个候选人参加。
Then, too, many directors are executives at other companies and have an interest in contributing to the general rise in executive pay.
此外，许多董事还是其他公司的管理人员，如果他们促成了管理人员的薪酬上涨，对于他们自己也有利。
According to Conyon, all these factors may contribute to rising executive pay at some companies. But he notes that there are counteracting forces as well. Many directors are older than the executives they oversee, and they often are retired and deeply concerned with their reputations. "I'm not sure that the directors at Enron are wildly happy with ending their careers that way," he says. "My guess is that, on balance, most directors are trying to make informed decisions with the appropriate amount of information that they are given."
康勇认为，所有这些因素都可能造成一些公司高管的薪金增加。但是他也指出还有一些抵消因素。许多董事都比他们监管的管理人员老得多，他们通常已经退休，非常注重自己的名声。他说：“我不确定安然公司（
Enron
）的董事们会希望他们以那样的方式结束自己的职业生涯。我的猜测是，大多数董事都试图运用他们所获得的信息做出明智的决定。”
Still, directors do have a financial incentive to keep on management's good side to avoid being eased out. In 2005, median directors received about $151,000 at large companies, $104,000 at medium-sized ones and $82,000 at small ones, according to a recent Corporate Library study. The directors, who set their own compensation levels, awarded themselves raises of about 20% between 2004 and 2005, the study found.
董事出于财务上的激励因素通常会鼓励管理层表现良好以避免被免职。根据企业图书馆公司最近所做的研究，
2005
年，大型公司的董事平均收入为
151
，
000
美元，中等规模公司的董事平均收入为
104
，
000
美元，小型公司的董事收入为
82
，
000
美元。该研究发现，制定自身薪酬标准的董事们在
2004-2005
年间为自己增加了
20%
的工资。
In a 2005 study,
Scott A. Richardson
and
Irem Tuna
of Wharton, DavidF.Larcker of Stanford and AndrewJ.Seary of SimonFraserUniversity in Canada looked at the effect of social links connecting CEOs and their compensation-committee members. A link, for example, would exist if a CEO and board member were both members of another company's board. The study, DirectorNetworks, Executive Compensation, and Organizational Performance, analyzed 22,074 directors at 3,114 companies. It found that CEOs with strong links to directors received substantially higher pay -- often hundreds of thousands of dollars more -- than those at comparable companies who did not have such links.
在一项
2005
年的研究中，沃顿商学院的斯科特·理查森（
Scott A. Richardson
）和艾尔玛·图纳
(Irem Tuna)
、斯坦福大学的戴维·拉克尔
(David F. Larcker)
以及加拿大西蒙佛雷泽大学
(Simon Fraser University)
的安德鲁·塞瑞
(Andrew J. Seary)
调查了首席执行官和他们的薪酬委员会成员之间的社会联系会产生什么样的影响。如果一位首席执行官和一位董事会成员同是另一家公司的董事
,
那么他们之间就建立起一种社会联系。一项名为《董事关系网，高管薪酬以及公司业绩》的研究分析了
3
，
114
家公司中的
22
，
074
名董事。研究发现，与董事关系密切的首席执行官获得的薪酬比那些没有如此联系的首席执行官要高出许多——通常会高出几十万美元。
The study also found that companies with such links tended not to perform as well as companies without such links, suggesting that CEOs were able to use these contacts to help keep their jobs despite sub-par performance. Ideally, says Richardson, the SEC should require companies to disclose this kind of link, but that is not among the commission's current executive-pay proposals. Nonetheless, the proposals should give shareholders better insight into executive pay, he says, adding that at many companies, CEOs receive multi-million dollar pension benefits that shareholders currently know nothing about. That would change if the proposals are adopted.
研究还发现，拥有这种联系的公司的业绩比那些没有这种联系的公司要差，这暗示着首席执行官即使表现欠佳，也能利用这些关系而保住自己的工作。理查森说，证交会最好应该要求公司揭示这种关系，但委员会目前的高管薪酬提案中并未作如此要求。不管怎样，他说这一提案应该能让股东更好地了解管理人员的薪酬。例如，他说，许多公司的首席执行官的养老金高达几百万美元，可是股东们却对此一无所知。如果委员会通过了这一提案，情况将会有所改变。
Like the others interviewed, Richardson does think the SEC proposals would drive executive pay down in the face of all the forces pushing them up. But the SEC has no legal authority to limit executive pay, nor would such authority be a good idea. "You certainly don't want regulators going in and second-guessing business decisions," he says. "Make people aware of these things, and the market should take care of it itself."
与其他被采访的人一样，理查森认为，尽管各方面因素都在推动高管薪酬上涨，但证交会通过此项提案将会导致薪酬的降低。然而证交会并没有权力限制管理人员的薪金，即使有这样的权力也并非是一件好事。他说：“你肯定不会希望监管人员横加干涉，每每在事后评论公司的商业决定。我们应该让人们意识到这些事实，然后让市场来处理。”
转自http://blog.hjenglish.com/cherish_7/articles/237685.html
posted on 2006-06-27 21:02
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